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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Statement of Facts:

Russell and Sandra Hafer ("Hafers") are a married couple. This

matter arises out of the Hafers' attempt to refinance their home with American Home
Mortgage Servicing, Inc ("AHMSI"), and the subsequent foreclosure and sale of the
home. On or about January 27, 2007 Russell Hafer purchased the subject home, located
at 402 S. Lodestone Avenue, Meridian, Idaho. R. p. 16. The loan was serviced by
AHMSI. R. p. 16.

In late 2010 an AHMSI employee advised Sandra Hafer that AHMSI

could lower the Hafers' mortgage payment, and convert the mortgage payment from an
adjustable payment into a fixed payment over 30 years, through the federal government's
Home Affordable Modification Program ("HAMP"). R. p. 112. AHMSI advised Mrs.
Hafer that in order to be considered for HAMP the Hafers needed to be behind on their
mortgage payments. R. p. 112. At AHMSI's recommendation the Hafers stopped making
mortgage payments in order to qualify for HAMP. R. p. 112.
During the latter part of 2010 and early 2011 the Hafers submitted a HAMP
application and supporting documentation to AHMSI.

On March 15, 2011 AHMSI

approved the Hafers for a "trial period plan" under HAMP. R. p. 112.

Under the trial

period plan the Hafers were required to make three trial period payments in a timely
manner. R. p. 112.

Pursuant to the trial period plan the Hafers' mortgage would be

permanently modified if they made their three trial period payments on time, and
submitted the required documents to AHMSI. R. p. 112. The Hafers accepted AHMSI's
offer and made the trial plan payments as required and submitted the required documents.
R. p. 112.

On June 28, 2011 AHMSI sent the Hafers a Home Affordable Modification
Agreement (the "Modification Agreement"). R. p. 112.

In order to accept the

Modification Agreement the Hafers were to sign two copies of the Modification
Agreement in front of a notary public and return both copies to AHMSI by July 13, 2011.
R. p. 112. Russell Hafer signed both copies of the Modification Agreement in front of a
notary public and returned them to AHMSI. R. pp. 112-113.

AHMSI received the

notarized copies of the Modification Agreement on July 13, 2011. R. p. 113.
On or about July 26, 2011 the Hafers received a letter from AHMSI advising
them that they were ineligible for a HAMP modification because AHMSI did not receive
the executed Modification Agreement by the due date. Mrs. Hafer called AHMSI and
advised them the signed Modification Agreement had been sent. AHMSI told Mrs. Hafer
that they did not receive the Modification Agreement, and that had it must have gotten
lost. R. p. 113. However, the UPS tracking slip indicates it was in fact received on July
13, 2011 by Toni Jones, AHMSI's case worker on the Hafers' application. R. p. 113.
After confronting Ms. Jones with the UPS tracking information she acknowledged
that it had been received, but was not properly notarized, and that she had sent out
another Modification Agreement for Russell Hafer to sign, notarize, and return. R. p. 113.
On or about July 30, 2011 the Hafers received a second Modification Agreement
from AHMSI, along with a letter to return the Modification Agreement by August 31,
2011. R. p. 112.

Russell Hafer signed, notarized, and returned the second Modification

Agreement to AHMSI by August 3, 2011. R. p. 112.

AHMSI rejected the second

modification agreement, contending that it was not timely received by AHMSI.
R. pp. 75-76.
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On December 15, 2011 AHMSI foreclosed on the home and had it sold at a
trustee's sale. Fannie Mae was the successful bidder. R. p. 77.
Procedural History:

On or about February 1, 2012 Fannie Mae filed a Post Foreclosure Eviction
Complaint For Ejectment And Restitution Of Property ("Complaint") against Russell
Hafer for possession of the property. R. pp. 7-1 ?. On February 28, 2012 the Hafers filed
an answer to Fannie Mae's complaint along with a third party complaint against AHMSI
containing the following causes of action: No Default (invalid foreclosure); wrongful
foreclosure while being considered for HAMP (wrongful foreclosure); breach of contract;
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; promissory estoppel;
equitable estoppel; Idaho Consumer Protection Act; Fraud; Negligence; Negligent
Infliction of Emotional Distress, and; Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.

~

13-25. On May 2, 2012 AHMSI filed an answer to the third-party complaint. R. pp. 2639.
On February 21, 2013 AHMSI and Fannie Mae filed a joint motion for summary
judgment. R. pp. 40-95.
143.

The Hafers filed an opposition on March 20, 2013. R. pp. 96-

AHMSI and Fannie Mae filed a reply on March 27, 2013. R. pp. 144-160.

The

court heard oral argument on May 29, 2013, at which time the court took the matter under
advisement. R. p. 202.

The court issued a written Memorandum Decision and Order on

July 10, 2013. R. pp. 201-218. The court granted Fannie Mae's motion for possession of
the home, and granted AHMSI's motion for summary judgment as to following causes of
action:

No Default (invalid foreclosure); breach of contract; breach of the implied

covenant of good faith and fair dealing; promissory estoppel; Fraud; Negligence;

3

Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, and; Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress. The court denied AHMSI's motion for summary judgment of the following
causes of action: wrongful foreclosure while being considered for HAMP (wrongful
foreclosure); equitable estoppel, and; the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. R. pp. 201218.

The district court subsequently ordered the judgments in favor of AHMSI and

Fannie Mae be certified as final judgments so that an appeal could be taken.
R. pp. 219-224.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1. Whether the court erred in granting summary judgment based on a legal issue
not raised in the pleadings.
It is well established law in Idaho that a party opposing a motion for summary
judgment must be given notice and opportunity to oppose the motion, and that the court
may not decide an issue not raised in the pleadings. Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc.,
126 Idaho 527 (Idaho 1994).
In this case, the court granted summary judgment to respondents on multiple
causes of action on the basis that AHMSI did not return a fully executed copy of the
Modification Agreement to the Hafers, and therefore a condition precedent to the
formation of the contract was not met. R. pp. 201-218.

AHMSI and Fannie Mae did not

argue in their joint motion for summary judgment that a contract was not formed, or that
the Modification Agreement was not entered, based on AHMSI's failure to return a
signed copy of the Modification Agreement to the Hafers. R. pp. 40-95.

The Hafers

neither disputed nor agreed that AHMSI failed to return a signed copy of the
Modification Agreement, and did not argue the legal significance of any such failure
because the issue was not raised in the pleadings. It was error for the court to grant
4

summary judgment on a legal theory that was not raised in the pleadings, and to which
the Hafers did not have a reasonable opportunity to contest.

2. Whether the Court erred m application of legal principle of 'Condition
Precedent.'
The comi held that there was no Modification Agreement as a matter of law
because of the failure of a condition precedent, specifically, that AHMSI did not return a
signed copy of the Modification Agreement to the Hafers. R. pp. 204-207. However,
under Idaho law a condition precedent to performance by the promisor is excused when
the occurrence or fulfillment is within the exclusive control of the promisor and the
promisor fails to fulfill the condition. Wade Baker & Sons Farms v. Corp. of the
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of LDS, 136 Idaho 922 (Idaho App.
2002). In this case the condition which the court held operated to impose a duty was
AHMSI returning of a signed copy of the Modification Agreement.

AHMSI cannot

cause the failure of the condition, and then avoid its duty to perform based on such a
failure. In this case the condition precedent was excused because its nonoccurrence was
caused solely by AHMSI.
ARGUMENT
In an appeal from an order of summary judgment, this Court's standard of review
is the same as the standard used by the district court in ruling on a motion for summary
judgment. All disputed facts are to be construed liberally in favor of the non-moving
party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are to be drawn in
favor of the non-moving party. Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539,541 (1991). Summary
judgment is appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together
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with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." McCoy v. Lyons, 120
Idaho 765, 769 (1991 ).
1. The court erred in granting summarv judgment based on a legal issue not raised in
the pleadings.
It is well established law in Idaho that the party against whom summary judgment

will be entered must be given adequate advance notice and an opportunity to demonstrate
why summary judgment should not be entered. Idaho Endowment Fund Inv. Board v.
Crane, 135 Idaho 667, 671 (2001). Furthermore, on a motion for summary judgment a
district court may not decide an issue not raised in the moving party's motion for
summary judgment. Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527 (1994).

In

Thomson the Idaho Supreme Court specifically held that a non-moving party is not
required to respond to issues not raised by the moving party even if the non-moving party
ultimately has the burden of proof at trial.
In this case the district court granted summary judgment to AHMSI on the
Hafers' first, third, and fourth causes of action, and to Fannie Mae on its claim for
possession of the home based on the theory that a contract was not formed because
AHMSI did not return a signed copy of the Modification Agreement to the Hafers.

~

204-207. However, neither AHMSI nor Fannie Mae raised that issue in their joint motion
for summary judgment. R. pp. 40-95. Accordingly, the district court erred in granting
summary judgment based on an issue that was not raised in the pleadings.

First Cause ofAction - No Default.
With regard to the Hafers' first cause of action against AHMSI, AHMSI argued in
its motion for summary judgment that there was no modification agreement, and that it
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was entitled to summary judgment because (1) the first Modification Agreement AHMSI
sent to the Hafers was not properly notarized, and; (2) the second Modification
Agreement AHMSI sent to the Hafers was not returned until after the stated deadline.

R.p. 79.
With regard to the first cause of action AHMSI did not raise the issue that no
agreement was entered between AHMSI and the Hafers due to AHMSI's failure to return
a signed copy of the Modification Agreement to the Hafers. In other words, the issue of
failure of a condition precedent was not raised in the motion. Despite AHMSI failing to
raise the issue in its motion, the court expressly granted summary judgment to AHMSI
based on AHMSI's own failure to return a signed copy of the Modification Agreement to
the Hafers, not based on the issues raised in the motion.
Specifically, the court held that AHMSI was entitled to summary judgment
because the parties did not enter into an agreement which resolved Mr. Hafer's default.
The court reasoned that the parties did not enter into an agreement because "It is
undisputed that AHMSI did not sign and return a copy of the Agreement to Mr. Hafer."

R. p. 205.
The Hafers did not dispute, or agree, that AHMSI did not sign and return a copy
of the Agreement to Mr. Hafer, because the issue was not raised as a basis for granting
summary judgment. Had the issue been raised, the Hafers could have either disputed the
alleged fact or made the legal argument that the nonoccurrence of the condition was
excused (See below). It was error for the court to grant summary judgment on an issue
that was not raised in the motion.
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There are genmne issues of material fact that preclude summary judgment in
favor of AHMSI.

AHMSI argued that there was no contract because the first

Modification Agreement was not properly notarized, and that the second Modification
Agreement was not timely returned. The Hafers have alleged and submitted evidence
which demonstrates that the first Modification Agreement was properly notarized (R. pp.
128-130, 161-164), and that the second Modification Agreement was timely returned. (R.
pp. 111-114). Accordingly, the court erred in granting summary judgment to AHMSI

Third Cause ofAction - Breach of Contract
Similarly, the court granted AHMSI's motion for summary judgment on the
Hafers' breach of contract claim on the basis that AHMSI did not return a signed copy of
the Modification Agreement to the Hafers. The court stated:
As noted above, the Modification Agreement sent to Mr. Hafer by
AHMSI specifically provided that the loan would not be modified "unless
and until" AHMSI accepted the Agreement by signing and returning a
copy of the Agreement to Mr. Hafer. ... Although the Hafers allege that
they returned all of the documentation requested by AHMSI in a timely
manner, they have not alleged that they received a signed copy of a loan
modification agreement from AHMSI. . . . As the Hafers have not
demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a binding loan
modification was executed, the Court concludes that summary judgment is
appropriate as to the Hafer's breach of contract claim."
(R. pp. 207).
The Hafers did not allege they received a signed copy of a loan modification
agreement from AHMSI because AHMSI never raised the issue in their motion that an
return of a fully executed copy was a necessary element for the formation of a contract,
or that AHMSI's failure to provide the Hafers with an executed copy was a condition
precedent to a valid contract. However, a non-moving party is not required to respond to
issues not raised by the moving party even if the non-moving party ultimately has the
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burden of proof at trial. Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527 (1994).
Therefore, it was an error for the court to grant summary judgment to AHMSI based on
an issue that was not raised in the pleadings, and to which the Hafers did not have a
reasonable opportunity to respond.
The only issues raised by AHMSI regarding contract formation were notarization
and timeliness. R. p. 79.

AHMSI argued that the first Modification Agreement was

invalid because it was not properly notarized.
admissible evidence to support that allegation.

However, AHMSI has offered no
AHMSI has not produced the

"improperly" notarized Modification Agreement, has not stated in what manner the
agreement was improperly notarized, or set forth any legal argument that the manner in
which it was "improperly" notarized has any legal significance. AHMSI' s "evidence" of
improper notarization is a mere conclusory, self-serving statement contained in the
affidavit from Cindi Ellis, an AHMSI employee, who saw a written notation from
someone else that the agreement was improperly notarized. R. pp. 43-46. Ms. Ellis'
affidavit it that regard is inadmissible because it lacks foundation and is nothing more
than hearsay (her statement), upon hearsay (the written file notes), upon hearsay (the
statement by whomever made the notes), upon hearsay (the allegedly improperly
notarized document that has not been produced).

There is absolutely no admissible

evidence that the Modification Agreement was not properly notarized. To the contrary,
the Hafers have alleged and submitted evidence demonstrating that the Modification
Agreement was properly notarized. R. pp. 128-130, 161-164. At best, there are disputed
facts regarding the formation of the first Modification Agreement, and for that reason
alone summary judgment should have been denied.
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AHMSI contends that the second Modification Agreement was invalid because it
was not timely returned.

Again, AHMSI has no admissible evidence to support its

contention. AHMSI' s contention is premised on the affidavit of employee Cindi Ellis,
which is nothing more than hearsay upon hearsay. Ellis' statement (hearsay) is based
upon her review of service notes (hearsay), which refer to a letter (hearsay

not

produced). R. pp. 43-46. Contrary to AHMSI's inadmissible hearsay, the Hafers, who
have personal knowledge of the facts, have stated that they received a letter stating that
the second Modification Agreement was not due until August 31, 2011, and that they
returned the signed and notarized Modification Agreement prior to the due date.
R. pp. 111-114. The only admissible evidence is that the second Modification Agreement

was in fact timely returned. It is certainly not undisputed that the second Modification
Agreement was not timely returned by the Hafers to AHMSI.

Accordingly, it was

improper for the court to grant summary judgment for AHMSI on the Hafers' breach of
contract cause of action.
Fourth Cause of Action - Violation of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

AHMSI combined its argument for summary judgment on the third and fourth
causes of action.

AHMSI did not argue that there was no binding Modification

Agreement because it did not return an executed copy to the Hafers. Nonetheless, the
court granted summary judgment to AHMSI on the Hafers' fourth cause of action for
violation of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing on the same grounds as it granted
summary judgment on the breach of contract claim, stating:
As discussed above, the Hafers have not demonstrated a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether a binding contract to modify the loan was
executed. Accordingly, summary judgment is appropriate to this claim.
(R. pp. 208).
10

AHMSI did not raise the issue of its failure to return a signed copy as an element
of contract formation or as an element to a claim for breach of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. Therefore, under the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in Thomson, the
Hafers were not required to address the issue in their opposition. It was an error for the
court to grant summary judgment on an issue not raised in the pleadings. As set forth
above there are genuine issues of fact that preclude summary judgment on the issues of
the whether the parties entered a Modification Agreement.

Summary Judgment in Favor of Fannie Mae for Possession
Fannie Mae argued that it was entitled to possession of the home following its
purchase of the home at the foreclosure sale. The Hafers argued that the foreclosure sale
was invalid because at the time of foreclosure they were not in default due to the loan
Modification Agreement, and that the notice of default did not comply with statutory
requirements.
In its decision on the motion for summary judgment, the district court stated:
The court notes that the Hafers have asserted that there was no
default of their loan obligation at the time the trustee's sale was
conducted. [cite omitted]. Idaho Code section 45-1505(2) provides that a
trustee may foreclose a trust deed by advertisement and sale if there is "a
default by the grantor or other person owing an obligation the performance
of which is secured by the trust deed or by their successors in interest with
respect to any provision in the deed which authorizes sale in the event of
default of such provision." The statute "requires that the default exist at
the time of the sale. It states that the trustee may foreclose a trust deed if
there 'is' a default by the grantor, not if there 'has been' a default by the
grantor." Taylor v. Just, 138 Idaho 137, 140, 59 P.3d 308, 311 (2002). In
Taylor v. Just the Idaho Supreme Court's Supreme Court concluded that
because the grantors and the beneficiary of a trust deed had entered into a
forbearance agreement which resolved the grantors' default, the
foreclosure sale was void, as there was no default at the time of the sale as
required by I.C. § 45-1505(2). The forbearance agreement executed by
the parties altered the terms of the promissory note by modifying the
11

payments due, and provide that if the grantors made the payments as
modified, the beneficiary would not proceed with the foreclosure. The
court concluded that the forbearance agreement "did not merely provide
that the sale would be postponed. It eliminated the default by altering the
terms of the promissory note so that there were no longer any sums past
due. (R. p. 204).
The district court then concluded that the "contemplated HAMP loan
modification" did not resolve Mr. Hafer's default or alter the terms of the loan obligation
so that there were no longer any sums past due at the time of the foreclosure sale."

~

204. The rationale for the court's decision was the following:
On or about June 28, 2011, AHMSI sent Mr. Hafer a proposed
Modification Agreement. The Modification Agreement provided, "I
understand that the Loan Documents will not be modified unless and until
(i) the Lender accepts this Agreement by signing and returning a copy of it
to me, and (ii) the Modification Date (as defined in Section 3) has
occurred." Ellis Affidavit, Exhibit B at 2. It is undisputed that AHMSI
did not sign and return a copy of the Agreement to Mr. Hafer."
Accordingly, the Court cannot conclude that AHMSI and Mr. Hafer
entered into an agreement which resolved Mr. Hafer's default. For the
reasons discussed above, the Court concludes that summary judgment in
favor of Fannie Mae is appropriate. (Emphasis Added). R. p. 205.
Again, the court granted summary judgment on an issue that was not raised by the
moving party. It is only "undisputed" that AHMSI did not sign and return a copy of the
agreement because neither AHMSI nor Fannie Mae raised the issue in thier pleadings. It
was an error for the court to grant summary judgment on an issue not raised in the
pleadings. Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527 (1994).
There are genuine issues of material fact that preclude summary judgment in
favor of Fannie Mae. If AHMSI and the Hafers did enter into a Modification Agreement
it is undisputed that the terms of the Modification Agreement modify the terms of the
obligation and resolve the default. The June 28, 2011 offer letter and summary provide:
"As previously described, if you comply with the terms of the Home Affordable
12

Modification trial period plan, we will modify your mortgage loan and waive all prior
late charges that remain unpaid. . . . Any past due amounts as of the end of the trial
period ... will be added to your mortgage loan balance." R. pp. 119-120. As set forth
above, there are disputed issues of fact in this case regarding contract formation which
preclude summary judgment.
2. The Court erred in application of the legal principle of 'Condition Precedent'.
As set forth above, the court erred in addressing the issue of whether AHMSI had
to sign and return a copy of the Modification Agreement to the Hafers before the
agreement would be effective.

However, even assuming the district court properly

addressed the issue, the court erred in its application of the doctrine of 'Condition
Precedent', and its decision is contrary to Idaho law and the weight of law in other
jurisdictions.
"A condition precedent is an event that is not certain to occur, but which must
occur, unless its nonoccurrence is excused, before performance under a contract will
become due. [cite omitted]. If there is a failure of a condition precedent through no fault
of the parties, no obligation of performance arises under the contract. [cite omitted].
However, when the happening of the event is within the exclusive or partial control of the
party whose obligation is conditioned upon the event, its nonoccurrence will not always
excuse the obligor's performance." Wade Baker & Sons Farms v. Corp. of the Presiding
Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of LDS, 136 Idaho 922 (Idaho App. 2002) ("Wade
Baker").
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In Fish v. Fleishman, 87 Idaho 126, 133, (1964), the Idaho Supreme Court stated
the rule of law concerning the principle of conditions precedent as follows:
The rule of law determinative of the principal issue raised by this
appeal has been well stated by Professors Williston and Corbin: It is a
principle of fundamental justice that if a promisor is himself the cause of
the failure of performance, either of an obligation due him or of a
condition upon which his own liability depends, he cannot take advantage
of the failure. ... The illustrations of this principle are legion. 5 Williston
on Contracts, § 677 (3d ed. 19610.
One who unjustly prevents the performance or the happening of a
condition of his own promissory duty thereby eliminates it as such a
condition. He will not be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong,
and to escape from liability for not rendering his promised performance by
preventing the happening of the condition on which it was promised.
3A Corbin on Contracts, § 767 (1960).
As noted by the Idaho Court of Appeal in Wade Baker, a more recent edition of
Williston On Contracts addresses the issue as follows:
A provision may be both a condition and a promise if one of the
parties additionally promised to insure that the condition would occur as
part of his bargain, and this independent promise to perform the condition
will subject the nonfulfilling party to liability for damages for a failure of
the condition to occur. Whether one who has made a conditional promise
undertakes impliedly to make the condition possible, depends on
reasonable inferences to be drawn in each case. When the occurrence of a
condition is largely or exclusively within the control of one party, so that
the party is largely or totally dependent on the party within whose control
the conditioning event lies, the express language of the condition often
gives rise to an implied promise.

If a promisor prevents or hinders the occurrence or fulfillment of a
condition to his or her duty of performance, the condition is excused; in
other words, "the nonoccurrence or nonperformance of a condition is
excused where the failure of the condition is caused by the party against
whom the condition operates to impose a duty." Accordingly, the liability
of the promisor is fixed regardless of the failure to fulfill the condition.
The pertinent rule ... is that where a party's breach by nonperformance
contributes materially to the nonoccurrence of a condition of one of his
duties, the nonoccurrence is excused, so that performance of the duty that
was originally subject to its occurrence can become due in spite of its
nonoccurrence. [cite omitted] Wade Baker at 925-926
14

The Court of Appeal in Wade Baker, further stated:
These longstanding principles governing application of conditions
precedent in contract law are consistent with, and tend to merge into, the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing which, under Idaho law, is implied
in every contract. [cites omitted]. The implied covenant requires that the
parties perform in good faith the obligations imposed by their agreement,
and a violation of the covenant occurs when the conduct of one party
violates, nullifies or significantly impairs any benefit or right conferred on
the other party by the contract. [cite omitted]. Thus, the implied covenant
places a good faith obligation on each party to take reasonable measures to
ensure that the other party obtains the benefits of the agreement." Id. At
926.
In Wade Baker, Wade Baker & Sons Farms ("Baker Farms") agreed to sell a
1,800 acre parcel to the Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-Day Saints ("LDS Corporation"). As part of the agreement to purchase the
property the LDS Corporation agreed that Baker Farms could retain the monetary benefit
of approximately $180,000 from the anticipated lease of 600 acres of the property to a
local farmer, Larry Adams. Baker Farms and the LDS Corporation agreed that the LDS
Corporation's payment of the $180,000 would be made immediately after (1) the sale of
the property was concluded, (2) title insurance was issued, and (3) the rent has been
paid. The agreement further provided that if Larry Adams did not lease the 600 acres

from the LDS Corporation then Baker Farms could lease it to a third party and retain the
rent, or could farm the 600 acres itself without paying rent.
The LDS Corporation allowed Larry Adams to farm the 600 acres without paying
rent, and did not pay Baker Farms the $180,000. Baker Farms brought suit against the
LDS Corporation to collect the $180,000.
The LDS Corporation moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the
payment of rent by Larry Adams to the LDS Corporation was a condition precedent to its
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obligation to remit payment of the $180,000 to Baker Farms, and that since Adams had
never paid rent its obligation to pay Baker Farms the $180,000 never came due. The
district court accepted the LOS Corporation's argument and granted it summary
judgment on Baker Farms' claims for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.
In applying the principles discussed above, the Idaho Court of Appeals reversed
the district court's decision, noting that there were material factual issues that made
summary judgment in favor of the LOS Corporation inappropriate. The Court of Appeals
stated:
First, the non occurrence of the condition precedent upon which the
LOS Corporation relies--Adams' failure to pay rent--was wholly or
partially within the LOS Corporation's control. The LOS Corporation
could have required that Adams execute a lease and pay the rent in
advance before he could commence farming operations in the spring of
1995. Draft versions of the lease that were exchanged with Adams in early
1995, but not signed, and the lease that was ultimately executed, provided
that the rent was due and payable upon execution of the lease, but the LOS
Corporation did not enforce this term. There are thus material issues as to
whether the LOS Corporation had an implied obligation to take reasonable
steps to collect the rent, whether it failed to do so, and whether by its
conduct the LOS Corporation materially contributed to the nonoccurrence
of the condition precedent. Id. at 926-927.
As was the case in Wade Baker, there are material issues that preclude summary
judgment in favor of AHMSI and Fannie Mae.

Specifically, the occurrence of the

condition precedent to AHMSI's obligation - AHMSI signing and returning the
Modification Agreement - was exclusively within AHMSI's control. "It is a principle of
fundamental justice that if a promisor is himself the cause of the failure of performance,
either of an obligation due him or of a condition upon which his own liability depends, he
cannot take advantage of the failure." Id. at 925. According to AHMSI it did not sign
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and return an executed copy of the Modification Agreement.

However, since that

condition was solely within AHMSI's control it cannot take advantage of its failure to
fulfill the condition and avoid its obligation. Furthermore, since the occurrence of the
condition was exclusively within AHMSI's control, such that the Hafers were totally
dependent on AHMSI to fulfill the condition, the express language of the condition gave
rise to an implied promise by AHMSI to fulfill the condition.
AHMSI had an obligation to fulfill the condition by signing and returning the
Modification Agreement. Since AHMSI prevented the occurrence of the condition its
nonoccurrence is excused, and AHMSI's duty under the Modification Agreement was
fixed despite the nonoccurrence. AHMSI's argument for not signing and returning the
Modification Agreement was that the first Modification Agreement was not properly
notarized, and that the second Modification Agreement was not timely returned. As set
forth above, there are disputed issues of fact regarding both of those contentions.
As was the situation in Wade Baker, "There are thus material issues as to whether
[AHMSI] had an implied obligation to take reasonable steps to [sign the modification
agreement], whether it failed to do so, and whether by its conduct [AHMSI] materially
contributed to the nonoccurrence of the condition precedent."
AHMSI cannot take advantage of its failure to fulfill a condition within its
exclusive control as a means to avoid liability under the contract. In fact, that was not
even an issue raised in the pleadings. It was improper for the district court to grant
summary judgment in favor of AHMSI based on the nonoccurrence of a condition
precedent within AHMSI's own control.
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In this case, the district court's determination that AHMSI's failure to return an
executed copy of the agreement to the Hafers rendered the Modification Agreement
ineffectual was based on the ruling in Lucia v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. 798 F. Supp. 2d
1059 (N.D. Cal 2011) ("Lucia f'). In Lucia /the district court held:
As noted above, the Modification Agreement sent to Mr. Hafer by
AHMSI specifically provided that the loan would not be modified "unless
and until" AHMSI accepted the Agreement by signing and returning a
copy of the Agreement to Mr. Hafer. ... Although the Hafers allege that
they returned all of the documentation requested by AHMSI in a timely
manner, they have not alleged that they received a signed copy of a loan
modification agreement from AHMSI. See, e.g., Lucia v. Wells Fargo
Bank, NA. 798 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1068 (N.D. Cal 2011). Discussing Grill
v. BAC Home Loans Servicing LP, 2011 WL 1217891 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 14,
2011) (stating that providing documentation was simply part of the
application process, and no binding modification would result unless and
until the lender sent the borrower an executed modification agreement).
. . . The Lucia court dismissed the borrowers' breach of contract claims
because they failed to allege that they had "met all the conditions set forth
in the TPP Contract for loan modification, including receipt of a 'fully
executed copy of a Modification Agreement,' and therefore failed to
allege the existence of a binding contract regarding a permanent loan
modification. Id at 1068. As the Hafers have not demonstrated a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether a binding loan modification was
executed, the Court concludes that summary judgment is appropriate as to
the Hafer's breach of contract claim."

The district court's reliance on Lucia I was misplaced. Three months after the
district court issued its decision in this matter, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeal reversed
the holding of Lucia I. Lucia v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 728 F.3d 878 (9th Cir. 2013)
"Lucia II"). "The issue we must decide is whether a bank was contractually required to
offer the plaintiffs a permanent mortgage modification after they complied with the
requirements of a trial period plan (" TPP" ). The district court held the bank was not, and
we reverse." Id. at 880.
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The Court in Lucia II noted that the HAMP guidelines, as set forth in Treasury
Supplemental Directive 09-0 I, require that "for borrowers who have made all their
payments and whose representations remain accurate, the servicer must offer a permanent
home modification loan. Id. at 882. The court concluded that the servicer cannot avoid
its duty to offer a permanent loan modification to a borrower who has complied with its
obligations under the TPP, by exercising unfettered discretion to not return a "fully
executed" copy of the TPJ and modification agreement.

In other words, the very

decision and reasoning that the district court relied on in this case to grant AHMSI's and
Fannie Mae's motion for summary judgment was reversed.
The Lucia matter is substantially similar to the case at bar. The service provider
sent the borrowers a TPP, which provided that if they made the TPP payments and
returned the required documents the service provider "will" modify the loan. Both sets of
plaintiffs in Lucia (Corvelo and Lucia) retuned the TPP documents and made the
required TPP payments, yet Wells Fargo did not offer them a permanent modification.
The same thing as happened in the case at bar. Similarly, Wells Fargo argued that there
was no binding loan modification agreement because it did not send a fully executed
copy of the modification agreement to the borrowers.
In Lucia I, the district court concluded that the language requiring the servicer to
provide a "fully executed copy of a Modification Agreement" was conditional for a
permanent modification, and that because the bank did not send the plaintiffs a "fully
executed copy of a Modification Agreement" that there was no contract for modification.
In reversing the district court's decision in Lucia II, the 9th circuit Court of
Appeals accepted and followed the ?1h Circuit's decision in Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank,
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N.A., 673 F.3d 547 (7 th Cir. 2012), which concluded that the conditional language of
receiving a "fully executed copy" of the modification agreement was not an enforceable
condition to a permanent modification agreement. The court in Wigod reasoned as
follows:
In other words, Wells Fargo argues that its obligation to send
Wigod a permanent Modification Agreement was triggered only if and
when it actually sent Wigod a Modification Agreement. Wells Fargo's
proposed reading of section 2 would nullify other express provisions of
the TPP Agreement. [ ... ] Under Wells Fargo's theory, it could simply
refuse to send the Modification Agreement for any reason whatsoeverinterest rates went up, the economy soured, it just didn't like Wigod- and
there would still be no breach. Under this reading, a borrower who did all
the TPP required of her would be entitled to a permanent modification
only when the bank exercised its unbridled discretion to put a
Modification Agreement in the mail. In short, Wells Fargo's interpretation
of the qualifying language in section 2 turns an otherwise straightforward
offer into an illusion." Id. at 884.
The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in Lucia II concluded:
We believe the reasoning in Wigod is sound. Paragraph 2G cannot
convert a purported agreement setting forth clear obligations into a
decision left to the unfettered discretion of the loan servicer. The more
natural and fair interpretation of the TPP is that the servicer must send a
signed Modification Agreement offering to modify the loan once
borrowers meet their end of the bargain. Under Paragraph 2G of the TPP,
there could be no actual mortgage modification until all the requirements
were met, but the servicer could not unilaterally and without justification
refuse to send the offer. As the Seventh Circuit stated in Wigod, the
modification was not complete until all of the conditions were met, "but
under paragraph 1 and section 3 of the TPP, Wells Fargo still had an
obligation to offer [the borrower] a permanent modification once [the
borrower] satisfied all obligations under the agreement." This
interpretation of the TPP avoids the injustice that would result were Wells
Fargo's position accepted and Wells Fargo allowed to keep borrowers' trial
payments without fulfilling any obligations in return. The TPP does not
contemplate such an unfair result. Lucia II at 883-884
The authority and reasoning relied on by the district court in granting summary
judgment to AHMSI and Fannie Mae has been overturned on appeal. (Lucia ID. The
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decisions expressed in Lucia 11 and Wigod are consistent with Idaho law on the principle
of conditions precedent - that if a promisor has exclusive control of the occurrence or
nonoccurrence of a condition precedent, and he does not fulfill the condition, then the
condition is excused and he cannot avoid liability, "in other words, 'the nonoccurrence or
nonperformance of a condition is excused where the failure of the condition is caused by
the party against whom the condition operates to impose a duty.'" Wade Baker at 926.
The district court's decision to grant summary judgment to AHMSI and Fannie
Mae was granted based on an issue not raised in the pleadings, is inconsistent with Idaho
law on the doctrine of 'condition precedent,' and was premised on the now overturned
decision in Lucia. For the reasons set forth above the district court erred in granting
summary judgment to AHMSI and Fannie on the above referenced claims. The Hafers
respectfully request that this court reverse the district court's decision.
ATTORNEY FEES

Appellants hereby requests costs and attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to
I.R.C.P. 54(e) and Idaho Code § 12-120(3) as the dispute arose out of a commercial
transaction.
CONCLUSION

Appellants respectfully request that his court reverse the District Court's decision
on respondents' motion for summary judgment.
Respectfully submitted this 25 th day of August, 2014.

TOWNSEND LAW, P.C.
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